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Abstract
We investigate whether the concept of guilt aversion in economics is related to the psy-
chological characterization of the same phenomenon. For trust games and dictator games
we report correlations between the guilt sensitivity measured within a framework of psy-
chological games most common in economics and the guilt sensitivity measured using a
questionnaire common in psychology (TOSCA-3). We find that the two measures correlate
well and significantly in the two settings.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest among economists to better understand how
emotions impact economic interactions. Many emotions in economics are modeled using psy-
chological game theory and belief-dependent preferences (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti,
1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009). One of the belief-dependent preferences is guilt aver-
sion. Guilt averse individuals trade off their own well-being on the other hand and how much
they let down others on the other hand, with the latter depending on their belief regarding oth-
ers’ expectations (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). Second-
order beliefs – what individuals think others expect from them – thus play a central role in the
economic analysis of guilt aversion.
Psychologists have a longer tradition in studying guilt and guilt aversion. Like economists,
they have highlighted the interpersonal nature of guilt. E.g. Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heather-
ton (1994) refers to guilt as a feeling of distress that arises whenever one has caused harm on to
somebody else or has violated a moral standard. Next to this, however, guilt might also arise
in reaction to a situation in which one feels having received more than deserved or violated
a moral standard even ‘when no one is harmed or disappointed or knows about the incident’
(Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton, 1994, p. 246-247). Thus, notwithstanding its connection
to the economic conceptualization, the psychological definition of guilt is broader as it more
generally refers to an emotional state associated with the violation of an intrinsic moral stan-
dard. This moral standard may be related to the (expected) beliefs or outcomes of others, but
not necessarily so. The psychological concept of guilt is often put in contrast to shame in that
guilt may lead to the repair of the violation or a correction of future behavior whereas shame
rather leads to withdrawal (see Tangney and Dearing, 2002, for a discussion).
Unsurprisingly, very distinct measures of guilt sensitivity have been developed in eco-
nomics and psychology. Economists focus on studying how people respond to second-order
beliefs in specific choice settings (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). This research typically
provides aggregate measures of guilt sensitivity for a given population.2 The approach has re-
2Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel (2011) present an analysis of the socio-economic determinants of guilt sensitivity
measured at the aggregate level in a large-scale survey experiment conducted in the Netherlands. They find little
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cently been extended to measure guilt sensitivity at the individual level (see Khalmetski, Ock-
enfels, and Werner, 2015; Attanasi, Battigalli, and Nagel, 2017; Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens,
2017). Psychologists on the other hand have developed extensive questionnaires to measure
guilt sensitivity at the individual level, including the Test of Self-Conscious Affect, hereafter
TOSCA (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, and Gramzow, 2000). TOSCA presents respondents with
a series of scenarios including six possible emotional reactions on a five-points Likert scale.
Feelings of guilt are one of these possible reactions, and the summation of the scale responses
across all scenarios generates a measure of guilt sensitivity at the individual level. It remains an
open question whether measures of guilt sensitivity developed in economics and psychology
are at all related – the focus of our analysis.
Establishing a relationship between these two measures would lend wider credibility to the
concept of guilt as defined in economics and provide new opportunities for the economic anal-
ysis of its socio-economic determinants. Measuring the economic concept of belief-dependent
guilt sensitivity at the individual rather than the aggregate level offers direct information about
its distribution in the population and thus more power to detect its correlates as compared to
aggregate measurements. However, this approach is not always implementable because of the
requirement to set up interactions between respondents as well as the need to measure the
causal effect of higher-order beliefs. The psychological TOSCA measure on the other hand is
simpler to implement in e.g. large representative samples because it does not involve interac-
tions. If correlated, the latter can serve as a proxy for economic guilt sensitivity.
Our paper relates to Bracht and Regner (2013) (BR2013), in which choices by trustees in
a Trust game are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including self-reported second-
order beliefs and psychological measures of guilt aversion (TOSCA-3 and GASP). They find
that these measures correlate significantly with choices in an intuitive way. Our study im-
proves upon theirs in three respects. First, our dependent variable is economic guilt sensitivity
at the individual level rather than the ‘extent’ of prosocial behavior (of trustees). The same ex-
tent of prosocial behavior can be hiding either a low guilt sensitivity combined with pro-social
second-order beliefs or a high guilt sensitivity combined with less pro-social second-order be-
evidence that guilt sensitivity varies across the various socio-economic characteristics of relevant players.
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liefs. Implicitly, the assumption in BR2013 is thus that economic guilt sensitivity is the same
for all subjects. Neglected heterogeneity of economic guilt sensitivity (documented here) will
likely be picked up by psychological measures of guilt aversion, exaggerating the effects of
the latter. Second, in contrast to BR2013 our analysis does not suffer from possible endogene-
ity issues related to the self-reporting of second-order beliefs. Such a ‘false consensus effect’
is known to lead to an overestimation of the effect of second-order beliefs on choices in trust
and related games (see Vanberg, 2008; Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjo¨tta, and Torsvik, 2010; Belle-
mare, Sebald, and Strobel, 2011; Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens, 2017). Third, even absent the
first two problems, joint significance of second-order beliefs and psychological measures of
guilt sensitivity as variables that explain pro-social behavior does not necessarily imply that
economic and psychological guilt sensitivities are correlated.
In this paper we use data that allow to identify economic guilt sensitivity at the individ-
ual level controlling for possible false consensus effects. We use these data to assess correlation
with a psychological measure of guilt sensitivity (TOSCA-3). We explore correlation both when
economic guilt sensitivity is measured in a binary Trust game or a binary Dictator game. We
find that the two measures are significantly correlated: Spearman rank correlations are well
above 0.2 in absolute value, and statistically significant in both sets of experimental games. We
also find that economic measures of guilt sensitivity do not correlate with other emotional dis-
positions covered by TOSCA-3 (such as proneness to shame, externalization, detachment, and
pride), a further indication that TOSCA-3 is able to capture fundamental elements of economic
guilt which are conceptually different than alternative emotions. This paper thus complements
recent efforts by economists to validate survey measures of preferences by establishing corre-
lation with experimental decisions (see e.g. Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde, 2016).
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design and
procedures. Section 3 presents our experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Methods and design
We use data from two experiments, namely a Trust game and a Dictator game, as well as data
from a TOSCA-3 questionnaire that participants answered after completion of the games. The
experimental data have been reported in our companion papers Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens
(2017) and Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018). Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017) use
data from the Trust and Dictator games and focus on comparing different methods of studying
the effect of second-order beliefs on behavior. Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) use data
from the Dictator game with the purpose of studying the effect of stakes on guilt sensitivity.
We explain the decision-making part of the games in Section 2.1 and the elicitation of TOSCA-3
guilt proneness in Section 2.2.3
2.1 Economic approach to measure guilt sensitivity
Participants in the Trust game played a binary Trust game. They were randomly allocated to
the roles of player A and player B at the start of the experiment. Participants in the role of A
were asked to choose between playing In or Out. Participants in the role of B were asked to
choose between playing Left or Right, conditional on the matched A choosing In and without
knowing A’s actual choice (strategy method). If player A chose Out, both players earned 20
points. If A chose In and B chose Left, A and B earned 30 and 32 points respectively. If A chose
In and B chose Right, A and B earned 14 and 42 points respectively.4
Participants in the Dictator game played three consecutive binary dictator games. They
were randomly allocated to the roles of player A and player B at the start of the experiment.
We refer to the dictator as B and to the passive player as A. Participants in the role of B were
asked to choose between playing Left and Right. In the first game, A and B earned respectively
48 and 50 points when B chose Left. A and B earned respectively 22 and 54 points when B chose
Right. In the two other games, all payoffs were multiplied by 2 and 4 respectively.5
3Notice that the experimental data we use in the current paper are from what we have referred to as the Menu
treatments in Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017).
4The conversion rate was as follows: 10 points = 40 DKK (about five Euros).
5Participants played the three dictator games in a random order and did not receive any feedback in between
these decision situations. The instructions made clear that total payoff in experimental points would be equal to
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The economic approach we used to measure guilt sensitivity in both games was the follow-
ing. Participants in the role of A were asked to report their belief about B’s choice; they were
asked to indicate how many out of 10 B-players they believe will choose Left. In the case of
the Trust game they were asked for the conditional first-order belief. Participants in the role
of B were asked whether they would choose Left or Right for each of the 11 possible levels of
belief of the matched A (see Figure A3 in the appendix). In the Trust game B was free to switch
back and forth between both options for different levels of A’s beliefs. In the Dictator game B
was not allowed to switch back and forth but instead could switch at most once from Right to
Left as beliefs of the matched A increased.6 The choices of B were subsequently matched to the
(first-order) belief of the matched A-players to determine the payoffs of both players.7
We illustrate the identification of guilt sensitivity using the model of ‘simple’ guilt intro-
duced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). In this
model, a guilt-averse B-player chooses Left if she believes sufficiently strongly that A would
be let down by her choosing Right instead. More formally, let θ ≥ 0 denote the guilt sensitivity
of player B, and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 the (mean) probability with which player B expects player A to ex-
pect her to choose Left (B’s second-order belief).8 Define piij as the payoff of player i if player B
chooses j with i = A, B and j = L, R. A guilt averse B chooses Left if piBL ≥ piBR− θ · β · (piAL −piAR ),
i.e. if β ≥ piBR−piBL
θ(piAL −piAR )
. This condition implies that conditional on B’s sensitivity to guilt θ, the
second-order belief β plays a key role in determining whether B chooses Left or Right. Specif-
ically, in case player B believes that A believes that no B-player chooses Left, there is neither
guilt in choosing Left nor Right. As a consequence, given that piBL < pi
B
R in our experiment, a
guilt averse player B chooses Right irrespective of her guilt sensitivity θ. On the other hand,
at a second- order belief β > 0, whether a guilt averse player B switches from Right to Left
the sum of payoffs obtained across all games. The conversion rate was as follows: 10 points = 4 DKK (about half a
Euro). Average earnings per hour were very similar to those in the Trust game.
6The motivation to allow for just one switch in the Dictator game was that this experiment was designed to
structurally estimate how guilt sensitivity depends on stakes in the context of the model of simple guilt of Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) (see our companion paper Bellemare, Sebald, and
Suetens, 2018).
7As we show in Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2017), this elicitation method does not lead to significant
differences in choices relative to a baseline treatment where second-order beliefs are self-reported.
8In the Trust game β represents player B’s conditional second-order belief, since B was asked to choose Le f t or
Right conditional on player A choosing In.
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Figure 1: Identification regions of guilt sensitivity θ
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Notes: The figure shows for both games the identification regions of guilt sensitivity θ corresponding to each switch-
point. The switch-point is defined as the second-order belief β at which player B switches from Right to Left. It is
equal to k if the dictator chooses Right for β ≤ k10 and chooses Left for β > k10 .
depends on θ. Whenever θ ≥ piBR−piBL
β(piAL −piAR )
, player B switches from Right to Left. Notice that the
switch-point is decreasing in β. Finally, if player B’s sensitivity to guilt θ < pi
B
R−piBL
(piAL −piAR )
, player B
will always choose Right independent of the second-order belief β. In this case, player B’s sen-
sitivity to guilt is not strong enough to induce a switch from Right to Left in our game. Figure
1 presents for both games the identification regions of θ corresponding to the belief at which
B switches from Right to Left. Note that identifications regions are insensitive to the three pay-
off scales used in the Dictator game experiment (see Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) for
more details).
2.2 Psychological approach to measure guilt sensitivity
Participants were asked to go through a questionnaire consisting of a slightly adjusted version
of the TOSCA-3 questionnaire printed in Tangney and Dearing (2002). The complete question-
naire used is presented in Section A.3 of the appendix.9 The TOSCA-3 is standard in psychol-
ogy and was developed to assess individuals’ sensitivity to social emotions. It contains 16 com-
9We slightly changed the choice of words in 5 out of the 16 scenarios in order to make the scenario appropriate
for a student-based subject pool. For example, we replaced words like ‘co-worker’ and ‘work’ by ‘other student’
and ‘student job’ without changing the nature of the emotional experience. The modified questionnaire is available
upon request.
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mon day-to-day scenarios drawn from written accounts of relevant experiences provided by a
sample of college students and non-college adults (e.g., ‘While out with a group of friends, you
make fun of a friend who’s not there.’). Each scenario is followed with item responses referring
to separate emotions. Emotions considered include guilt, shame, detachment, externalization,
and pride (see appendix A.3 for examples of item responses). For each item response, partici-
pants are asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the likelihood of responding in the indicated way,
ranging from 0 (not sensitive) to 4 (highly sensitive). Measures of guilt sensitivity, shame prone-
ness, externalization, pride, and detachment are respectively computed by summing together
reported scales across all item responses specific to the emotion. All of the 16 scenarios have
item responses that qualify for guilt-proneness, shame-proneness, and externalization. Other
responses qualify for detachment (in 11 out of the 16 scenarios), and pride (in the remaining
5). Our psychological measures of guilt sensitivity, shame sensitivity, and externalization thus
range from 0 to 64. The measure of detachment ranges from 0 to 44, while the measure of
pride ranges from 0 to 20. Our analysis will correlate each of the emotions measured using the
TOSCA questionnaire with the economic measure of guilt sensitivity.
In the introduction we mentioned that the psychological definition of guilt is somewhat
broader than the economic definition. It not only refers to feelings of distress that arise in
interpersonal relations whenever one feels that one has caused harm on to somebody else or is
in the wrong but can also arise in reaction to e.g. positive inequity or when one feels to have
violated some moral standard even ‘when no one is harmed or disappointed and no one knows
about the incident’. This might broadly suggest that a division of the TOSCA scenarios could be
relevant depending on whether somebody else is harmed or let down as a consequence of one’s
action. Roughly speaking it seems that scenarios 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 16 involve a possible
harm inflicted on somebody else or a potential let down of somebody else. All other scenarios
seem to relate more to issues concerning positive inequity or the violation of an internal moral
standard.
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2.3 Experimental procedures
The Trust game was run in May 2011 while the Dictator game was run in February and Septem-
ber 2012. Both experiments were conducted in the Laboratory of the Center of Experimental
Economics at the University of Copenhagen. The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The Trust and
Dictator games had 42 and 142 participants respectively in the role of player B.10 At the begin-
ning of a session participants were randomly allocated to a computer terminal. Once seated,
they received instructions explaining they were matched in pairs and that they were randomly
allocated to one of the roles. Instructions can be found in Sections A.1 and A.2 of the appendix.
Upon completing the experiment and the TOSCA-3 questionnaire, participants were informed
of their payoffs, completed a short post-experimental questionnaire, were paid and dismissed.
Finally, we note that one may argue that having subjects complete the TOSCA-3 question-
naire right after the elicitation of the choices in the experiment may raise concerns of possible
spurious correlations between the two measures due to subjects’ wish to be consistent (see e.g.
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003). However, given that the two tasks are of a
very different nature it not obvious at all for laymen what it means to be consistent.11
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
The economic approach allows to bound guilt sensitivity for B-players who switch at most once
from playing Right to playing Left as second-order beliefs increased. 32 out of 42 B-players in
the Trust game and, by design, all B-players in the Dictator game satisfy this requirement.12
Our economic measure of guilt sensitivity is given by the switch-point defined as the belief at
10Due to an error in the computer program, the data from 2 B-players in the Dictator game were not usable,
leaving us with 140 B-players in this experiment. We had an excess of dictators relative to passive players in the
Dictator game as their decisions was the central focus of the analysis (see Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens, 2018).
11Our procedures are similar to Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) who validate a
survey measure of risk by administrating a questionnaire immediately before subjects took part in an incentived
economic experiment.
12In order to avoid arbitrarily choosing one of multiple switch points, we excluded from the analysis the 10
participants in the Trust game experiment who switched more than once.
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Figure 2: Distributions of switch points
(a) Trust game
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Fr
ac
tio
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10all L all R
Switchpoint
(b) Dictator game
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Fr
ac
tio
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10all L all R
Switchpoint
Notes: Distribution of switch points for the Trust game (panel (a), N = 32) and the Dictator game (panel (b),
N = 140x3). The data from the Dictator game are pooled across the three stake levels.
which B chose to switch from playing Left to playing Right. The value of the switch-point ranges
from 11 (not sensitive – corresponding to choosing Right irrespective of second-order beliefs)
to 0 (highly sensitive – corresponding to choosing Left irrespective of second-order beliefs).
B-players switch on average at a belief of 6.22 in the Trust game and of 6.03 across the
three Dictator games. The median switch-point is 6 in both types of games. Figure 2 displays
the distributions of switch points in both games. We find that more than 20% of B players
in the Trust game and slightly more than 25% of B players in the Dictator game chose Right
irrespective of the belief of the other player. These players are thus (close to) selfish; their guilt
sensitivity lies within the lowest possible interval (see Figure 1). About 33% of players in the
Trust game have a switch-point of 5 or 6, corresponding to a guilt sensitivity θ between 1.04 and
1.56. In the Dictator game, about 27% of players have a switch-point of 5 or 6, corresponding
to a guilt sensitivity θ between 0.26 and 0.38.13
Regarding TOSCA-3 guilt proneness, we find a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.645 for the Trust game
and 0.749 for the Dictator game, and of 0.725 for the merged sample. The internal consistency
of the answers related to guilt proneness in the Trust game is lower than in the Dictator game.
However, the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for alpha is (0.565, 0.767) for the Trust
13Bellemare, Sebald, and Suetens (2018) provide a detailed analysis of the distribution of switch-points in the
Dictator game experiment for all three stake levels. Distributions are not significantly different between the first
two payoff scales, while distributions for the lowest and highest payoff scales are significantly different, consistent
with diminishing guilt sensitivity.
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Figure 3: Distributions of TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity
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Notes: The figure shows distributions of guilt sensitivity of B-players computed using the TOSCA-3. Panel (a) is
based on players in the Trust game (N = 42), while panel (b) is based on players in the Dictator game (N = 140).
game and (0.696, 0.838) for the Dictator game, so that the null that alpha is equal to 0.7 is
rejected for neither of the two settings (see Padilla, Divers, and Newton, 2012, for details on the
bootstrap procedure). This leads us to conclude that internal consistency is sufficiently strong
in both settings. The observation that the confidence interval for the Trust game is wider than
for the Dictator game reflects the relatively lower sample size.
Figure 3 shows the distributions of psychological guilt sensitivity in both experiments.
There are no clear differences between the two distributions. We find that average guilt sen-
sitivity of B-players is 46.4 in the Trust game and 45.9 in the Dictator game (p = 0.845 in a
Mann-Whitney-U test). This suggest that TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity is robust to the nature of
economic decision-making that took place beforehand. These results combined with the over-
lap on confidence intervals for Cronbach’s alpha support pooling data from both games.
3.2 Correlations
Table 1 reports for both experiments Spearman rank correlations between guilt sensitivities
measured using the two approaches as well as associated p-values (in parentheses). Correlation
between measures is -0.33 and -0.25 in the Trust game and Dictator game respectively and
statistically significant (p = 0.067 and p = 0.003 respectively). The interpretation is that a
higher economic guilt sensitivity in the experiment – a lower switch-point – is associated with
10
a higher score on the TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity scale. Note that the rank correlations for the
three stake levels separately are -0.148 (p = 0.081), -0.213 (p = 0.011) and -0.219 (p = 0.009)
for low, middle and high stakes respectively. The games with higher stakes thus correlate best
with the TOSCA-3 score.
One might be tempted to see the correlations relative to a perfect correlation of 1 or -1.
However, such a perfect correlation can only be obtained if there would not be any measure-
ment error, which is obviously not realistic (see Falk et al., 2016, for a discussion in the context
of other preferences). Thus, due to measurement error, the maximum possible correlation be-
tween our measure for economic guilt sensitivity and the TOSCA-3 guilt aversion score would
be lower than one even if the latter would measure guilt sensitivity equally well as the eco-
nomic measure. In order to have a benchmark for comparison, we calculate the correlations
between the three subsequent choices within the Dictator experiment. Subjects in the Dictator
experiment were elicited their switch-point in three subsequent games that varied only in the
level of stakes. The correlations between the three switch-points are 0.347 between the first and
the second, 0.395 between the first and the third and 0.624 between the second and the third,
which is in the same ball park as the ‘test-retest’ correlations reported by Falk et al. (2016) for
other preference measures (risk preferences, time discounting, altruism and reciprocity). This
leads us to conclude that the level of between economic and psychological guilt sensitivity is
substantial.
A further result is that correlations between our economic measure of guilt sensitivity and
other emotional dispositions identified in the TOSCA-3 are much smaller in absolute value,
not robust across the two experiments, and not statistically significant (see Table A1 in the
appendix). This squares well with the result of Bracht and Regner (2013) that trustworthiness
in a Trust game correlates significantly with guilt proneness but not shame proneness, both of
which were elicited in a separate questionnaire. The results overall suggest that the TOSCA-3
measure of guilt aversion may serve as a valid proxy for economic guilt sensitivity.
We next analyze whether a smaller subset of TOSCA-3 scenarios better correlates with eco-
nomic guilt sensitivity. This exercise is useful if searching for a proxy for economic guilt sen-
sitivity in settings where TOSCA-3 is available and economic measures are not. We measure
11
Table 1: Rank correlations between economic guilt sensitivity and TOSCA-3 emotional dispositions
Trust game Dictator game
Guilt proneness -0.328 (p = .067) -0.246 (p = .003)
Shame proneness 0.074 (p = .688) -0.094 (p = .271)
Detachment 0.028 (p = .878) 0.049 (p = .564)
Externalization -0.040 (p = .827) 0.000 (p = .999)
Pride (a) 0.012 (p = .950) 0.061 (p = .476)
Pride (b) 0.115 (p = .532) 0.106 (p = .215)
N 32 140
Notes: The table reports Spearman rank correlations (and p-values) between switch points and the six emotional
dispositions elicited in the TOSCA-3 questionnaire.
the subset of TOSCA-3 questions which has the highest power of predicting economic guilt
sensitivity based on the leaps and bounds approach proposed by Furnival and Wilson (1974).
In our context, the leaps and bounds approach covers the space of all possible combinations of
TOSCA-3 scenarios (predictors), while avoiding obvious inferior subsets and thus the need to
compute the predictive power of all possible combinations of scenarios. The implementation
of the leaps and bounds algorithm is based on the linear regression of the economic guilt sen-
sitivity measure (the switch-point) on each scenario’s guilt-proneness item response scale (0 to
4). For a given number of k predictors, the algorithm can be shown to select the best k scenarios
from those available in order to minimize the residual sum of squares of the regression (see
Lindsey and Sheather, 2010, for further references). Our analysis pools data from both dictator
and trust games, controlling for differences across games using a binary variable separating
data from each game of which the effect is kept constant throughout the algorithm.14
Table 2 gives an overview of the three best-predicting scenarios (numbered) and corre-
sponding guilt proneness item responses (lettered) across the Dictator game and Trust game
experiment. We find that 11e – corresponding to scenario 11 and item response e – is the best
individual predictor of economic guilt sensitivity. The best set of two predictors contains 11e
and 9d, while the best set of three predictors contains 11e, 9d and 5d. Table A2 in the appendix
presents the full range of best subsets of TOSCA-3 scenarios retrieved from the algorithm along
with model selection statistics, including Akaike, the Bayesian Information Criteria, and ad-
14The algorithm is implemented using the vselect command in Stata (see Lindsey and Sheather, 2010).
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Table 2: Best-fitting TOSCA-3 scenarios
Scenario Description and corresponding guilt item response
11 ‘You and a group of college students worked very hard on a project. Your professor
singles you out for a better grade than anyone else.’
item e ‘You would feel you should not accept it.’
9 ‘You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.’
item d ‘You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down the road.
5 ‘You make a mistake at your student job and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.’
item d ‘You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.’
Notes: TOSCA-3 scenarios (numbered) and corresponding guilt proneness item responses (lettered) derived using
the leaps and bounds algorithm. See Section A.3 of the appendix for the full TOSCA-3 including all items.
justed R2. Model selection statistics provide guidance on the predictive power of each subset
of scenarios. AIC, AICC, and BIC model selection statistics prefer subsets with either 2 or 3
scenarios. Model selection based on adjusted R2 points towards a larger subset of 7 scenarios.
However, the change in adjusted R2 from 2 scenarios to 7 scenarios is rather small.
Finally, Table 3 presents rank correlations between the economic measure of guilt sensitivity
(the switch-points) and guilt sensitivity computed using the three smallest subsets of scenarios
presented in Table A2. The latter are computed by summing the guilt proneness item response
scale of each scenario (ranging from 0 to 4) in a given subset, similar to the way the overall
TOSCA-3 measure is computed. We find that correlations between guilt sensitivities based on
the best subset of three scenarios and switch- points are -0.398 in the Trust game, and -0.323
in the Dictator game. Both correlations are higher in absolute value than the corresponding
correlations computed using all 16 TOSCA-3 scenarios (the latter were -0.328 and -0.233 re-
spectively, see Table 1). Moreover, the best or two best scenarios also correlate well with the
economic measure of guilt sensitivity.
4 Conclusion
Economists and psychologists have developed separate measures of guilt sensitivity based
on fundamentally different approaches to model and capture guilt aversion. Economists ap-
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Table 3: Rank correlations between economic and psychological measures of guilt sensitivity com-
puted from subsets of TOSCA-3 scenarios
Trust game Dictator game
11e -0.293 (p = .104) -0.193 (p = .022)
11e + 9d -0.294 (p = .103) -0.284 (p < .001)
11e + 9d + 5d -0.398 (p = .024) -0.323 (p < .001)
N 32 140
Notes: Spearman rank correlations (and p-values) between switch points and guilt sensitivity measured using sub-
sets of TOSCA-3 scenarios. TOSCA-3 scenarios (numbered) and corresponding guilt proneness item responses
(lettered) derived using the leaps and bounds algorithm.
proach guilt aversion using mathematical models firmly grounded in psychological game the-
ory where higher-order beliefs are central to determine the extent to which individuals are
averse to letting down others. The TOSCA questionnaire used in psychology, on the other
hand, is not grounded in a specific behavioral model anchored on beliefs, yet is able to cap-
ture guilt aversion using self-reported feelings of guilt in the context of a range of day-to-day
scenarios.
Our results show that guilt sensitivity elicited in the context of the model of simple guilt
by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) is fundamentally related to the TOSCA-3 measure of guilt
sensitivity, and unrelated to other emotional dispositions measured using TOSCA-3. The cor-
relation with TOSCA-3 guilt sensitivity is in absolute value equal to 0.33 in the Trust game
and to 0.25 in the Dictator games (statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively).
These correlations are not just statistically significant but also substantial in size, in particular
if compared to the correlations between three measures for economic guilt sensitivity elicited
in three subsequent Dictator games that are the same in terms of the incentive to avoid guilt.
The result is good news for economists because it gives credit to a rigorous approach to guilt
and guilt aversion.
This paper further identifies a small subset of TOSCA-3 which can be used to construct
a simpler and better predictor of economic measures of guilt sensitivity, which fits well with
recent efforts to validate simple and short survey measures of preferences by establishing cor-
relation with experimental decisions (see e.g. Falk et al., 2016, 2018). As we are the first to
14
document such a finding in the context of guilt aversion further research in this direction is
warranted.
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Instructions Experiment 1
A.1.1 General part
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make
a number of decisions. Please follow the instructions carefully. At the end of the experiment,
you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your
hand and one of us will help you.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others and
the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
Payoffs in the experiment are specified in points. At the end of the experiment the points will
be exchanged into DKK at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 40 DKK
A.1.2 Instructions player A
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly
assigned to the role of “player A”, and the other participant to the role of “player B”. Your role
will be player A.
The experiment is connected to the following decision situation:
Choice of player A: In relation to the decision situation above, you will be asked the following
two questions:
• What do you choose, IN or OUT?
• Suppose that you choose IN, out of 10 B-players, how many do you think will choose
LEFT? We call the answer to the first question player A’s choice and the answer to the
second question player A’s belief.
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In Out 
Left Right 
30 
32 
14 
42 
20 
20 
A 
B 
Figure A1
We call the answer to the first question your choice and the answer to the second question your
belief.
Choice of player B: player B will be asked the following questions, supposing that you chooses
IN:
• What do you choose, LEFT or RIGHT?
• Out of 10 B-players, how many do you think player A believes choose LEFT in your
situation? [only included in treatment Baseline]
We call the answer to the first question player B’s choice and the answer to the second question
player B’s belief. [only included in treatment Baseline]
How are payoffs calculated?
As can be seen in the figure on the previous page, if you choose OUT, you and B both earn 20
points independent of player B’s choice.
If you choose IN, the earnings of you and player B depend on player B’s choice. If player B
chooses LEFT, you earn 30 points and player B earns 32 points. If player B chooses RIGHT, you
earn 14 points and B earns 42 points.
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At the end of the experiment you and player B will be paid according to what you both an-
swered to the questions.
A.1.3 Instructions player B
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly
assigned to the role of “player A”, and the other participant to the role of “player B”. Your role
will be player B.
The experiment is connected to the following decision situation:
[Figure A1 is shown]
Choice of player A: In relation to the decision situation above, player A will be asked the fol-
lowing two questions:
• What do you choose, IN or OUT?
• Suppose that you choose IN, out of 10 B-players, how many do you think will choose
LEFT? We call the answer to the first question player A’s choice and the answer to the
second question player A’s belief.
Choice of player B: You will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT supposing that player A
chooses IN. More specifically, you will be asked the following questions:
• Suppose player A chooses IN and believes that 0 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what
do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
• Suppose player A chooses IN and believes that 1 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what
do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
• Suppose player A chooses IN and believes that 2 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what
do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
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• Suppose player A chooses IN and believes that 3 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what
do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
• ...
• ...
• ...
• Suppose player A chooses IN and believes that 10 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what
do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
How are payoffs calculated?
As can be seen in the figure on the previous page, if player A chooses OUT, player A and you
both earn 20 points independent of player A’s belief or your choice.
If player A chooses IN, the earnings of player A and you depend on player A’s belief and your
choice. If player A’s belief and your choice are such that you choose LEFT, A earns 30 points
and you earn 32 points. If player A’s belief and your choice are such that you choose RIGHT, A
earns 14 points and you earn 42 points.
Example: Suppose that A chooses IN and believes that 8 out of 10 B-players will choose LEFT,
following his/her choice IN. Suppose further that you choose LEFT if A believes that more than
4 B-players choose LEFT following A’s choice IN, and that you choose RIGHT if A believes that
4 or less B-players choose LEFT following A’s choice IN. In this case, the outcome will be (IN,
LEFT) which implies that A earns 30 and you earn 32.
At the end of the experiment player A and you will be paid according to what you both an-
swered to the questions.
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A.2 Instructions Experiment 2
A.2.1 General part
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make
a number of decisions. Please follow the instructions carefully. At the end of the experiment,
you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. You are not allowed to communicate
with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will help you.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others and
the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
Payoffs in the experiment are specified in points. At the end of the experiment the points will
be exchanged into DKK at the following exchange rate: 10 points = 4 DKK.
In the experiment, participants are divided into pairs. In each pair, one participant is randomly
assigned to the role of “player A”, and the other participant to the role of “player B”.
A.2.2 Instructions player A
Your role will be player A.
In the experiment you will be confronted with a number of decision situations like the follow-
ing:
Figure A2: Example of a decision situation
Player B earns 27.Player B earns 25.
RIGHT
Player A earns 11.
LEFT
Player A earns 24.
Player B
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That is, player B will get the chance to decide between LEFT and RIGHT. The only difference
between the decision situation depicted above (in Figure 1) and the situations you will be con-
fronted with during the experiment are the payoffs connected to player B’s choices LEFT and
RIGHT.
What are the decisions that have to be taken during the experiment?
Choice of player A: In each decision situation that you will be confronted with, you will be
asked the following question:
• Out of 10 B-players, how many do you believe will choose LEFT?
We call the answer to this question your belief.
Choice of player B: player B will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT.
How are payoffs calculated?
Assume that you are confronted with the decision situation as shown in Figure 1.
The earnings of you and player B in this decision situation depend on player B’s choice. If
player B chooses LEFT, you earn 24 points and player B earns 25 points. If player B chooses
RIGHT, you earn 11 points and B earns 27 points.
At the end of the experiment the payoffs from the different decision situations will be summed
and you and player B will be paid accordingly.
Following these decisions there will be a questionnaire.
A.2.3 Instructions player B
Your role will be player B.
In the experiment you will be confronted with a number of decision situations like the follow-
ing:
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[Figure A2 is shown]
That is, you will get the chance to decide between LEFT and RIGHT. The only difference be-
tween the decision situation depicted above (in Figure 1) and the situations you will be con-
fronted with during the experiment are the payoffs connected to your choices LEFT and RIGHT.
What are the decisions that have to be taken during the experiment?
Choice of player A: In each decision situation, player A is informed that you can choose LEFT
or RIGHT, and about the payoffs connected to these choices. player A will be asked the follow-
ing question: Out of 10 B-players, how many do you believe will choose LEFT?
We call the answer to this question player A’s belief.
Choice of player B: You will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT. More specifically, you will be
asked the following questions:
• Suppose player A believes that 0 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what do you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?
• Suppose player A believes that 1 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what do you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?
• Suppose player A believes that 2 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what do you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?
• Suppose player A believes that 3 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what do you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?
• ...
• ...
• ...
• Suppose player A believes that 10 out of 10 B-players choose LEFT, what do you choose
LEFT or RIGHT?
24
How are payoffs calculated?
Assume that you are confronted with the decision situation as shown in Figure 1.
The earnings of player A and you in this decision situation depend on player A’s belief and
your choice. If player A’s belief and your choice are such that you choose LEFT, A earns 24
points and you earn 25 points. If player A’s belief and your choice are such that you choose
RIGHT, A earns 11 points and you earn 27 points.
Example: Suppose that A believes that 8 out of 10 B-players will choose LEFT. Suppose further
that you choose LEFT, if A believes that more than 4 B-players choose LEFT and that you choose
RIGHT, if A believes that 4 or less B-players choose LEFT. In this case, the outcome will be (IN,
LEFT) which implies that A earns 24 and you earn 25.
At the end of the experiment the payoffs from the different decision situations will be summed
and player A and you will be paid accordingly.
Following these decisions there will be a questionnaire.
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A.3 The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3)
Instructions 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common 
reactions to those situations. 
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would 
be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or 
react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. 
For example: 
You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside. 
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up ① - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
on news. not likely        very likely  
 
b) You would take the extra time to read the 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -⑤ 
paper. not likely        very likely  
 
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining. 1 - - 2 - - ③ - - 4 - -5 
           not likely                           very likely  
 
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - ④ - -5 
               not likely        very likely  
 
In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a “1” for answer (a) 
because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning — so it’s not at all likely 
that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time 
in the morning (very likely). I circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. 
Sometimes I wouldn’t — it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a “4” for answer (d) 
because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early. 
  
Please do not skip any items — rate all responses. 
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Questionnaire 
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your friend up. 
 
a) You would think: “I’m inconsiderate  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
                     not likely  very likely  
 
b) You would think: “Well, my friend  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
will understand.”         not likely  very likely  
 
c) You’d think you should make it up to your 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
           friend as soon as possible.             not likely  very likely  
 
d) You would think: “My boss distracted me  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
           just before lunch.”    not likely  very likely   
  
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it. 
 
a) You would think: “This is making me anxious.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
I need to either fix it or get someone else to.”  not likely  very likely               
       
b) You would think about quitting.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
            not likely  very likely  
 
b) You would think: “A lot of things aren’t made  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
      very well these days.”     not likely  very likely 
              
d) You would think:  “It was only an accident.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
        not likely  very likely 
 
 
3. You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and attractive. Your best 
friend’s spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company. 
 
a) You would think: “I should have been   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
aware of what my best friend was feeling.”  not likely  very likely 
        
b) You would feel happy with you appearance and  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 personality.      not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would feel pleased to have made such a   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
good impression.     not likely  very likely 
 
 d) You would think your best friend should pay   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
attention to his/her spouse    not likely                     very likely 
    
 e) You would probably avoid eye contact for a long time. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
         not likely                     very likely 
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      4.  At university or work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. 
 
a) You would feel incompetent.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely  
b) You would think: “There are never enough hours 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 in the day.”      not likely  very likely 
      
c) You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded for  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 mismanaging the project.”    not likely  very likely 
 
d) You would think: “What’s done is done.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       not likely  very likely 
 
 
      5.  You make a mistake at your student and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. 
 
a) You would think the company did not like  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
the coworker.      not likely  very likely  
 
b) You would think: “Life is not fair.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely 
      
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 coworker.      not likely  very likely 
 
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
correct the situation.      not likely  very likely 
 
 
6.  For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make the call 
and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well. 
 
a)        You would think: “I guess I’m more   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
persuasive than I thought.”    not likely  very likely  
 
b) You would regret that you put it off.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely 
      
c) You would feel like a coward.     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
        not likely  very likely 
 
d) You would think: “I did a good job.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
.     not likely                      very likely 
 
 e) You would think you shouldn’t have to   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  make calls you feel pressured into.   not likely                      very likely 
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7.  While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
 
a) You would feel inadequate that you can’t  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 even throw a ball.     not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would think maybe your friends needs   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
 more practice at catching.    not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would think: “It was just an accident.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
.     not likely                      very likely 
 
 d) You would apologize and make sure your  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  friend feels better.     not likely                      very likely 
 
 
8.  You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very helpful. A few 
times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could. 
 
a) You would feel immature.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
        not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would think: “I sure ran into some     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 bad luck.”      not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would return the favor as quickly   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 as you could.      not likely                      very likely 
 
 d) You would think: “I am a trustworthy   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  person.”      not likely                      very likely 
  
e) You would be proud that you repaid   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  your debts.      not likely                      very likely 
 
 
9.  You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
 
a) You would think the animal shouldn’t   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 have been on the road.     not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would think: “I’m terrible.”      1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely                      very likely 
 
 d) You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  driving down the road     not likely                      very likely 
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10.  You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did poorly. 
 
a) You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would think: “The instructor doesn’t    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 like me.”      not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would think: “I should have studied   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 studied harder.”            not likely                      very likely 
  
 d) You would feel stupid.     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
         not likely                      very likely 
  
 
11.  You and a group of college students worked very hard on a project. Your professor singles you 
out for a better grade than anyone else. 
 
a) You would feel the professor is rather   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 short-sighted.      not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would feel alone and apart from     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 your colleague-students.     not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would feel your hard work had    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
 paid off.             not likely                      very likely 
 
d) You would feel competent and proud    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 of yourself.             not likely                      very likely 
  
 e) You would feel you should not accept it.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
         not likely                      very likely 
  
  
12.  While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there. 
 
a) You would think: “It was all in fun;   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 it’s harmless.”      not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would feel small . . . like a rat.     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would think that perhaps that friend  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 should have been there to defend       not likely                      very likely 
 him/herself.  
 
 d) You would apologize and talk about that  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  person’s good points.     not likely                      very likely 
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13.  You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you, and 
your boss criticizes you. 
 
a) You would think your boss should have   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 been more clear about what was   not likely  very likely  
 expected of you. 
       
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would think: “I should have recognized  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 the problem and done a better job.”       not likely                      very likely 
   
 d) You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
         not likely                      very likely 
  
 
14.  You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns out to be 
frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting, but then you see how 
happy the kids are. 
 
a) You would feel selfish, and you’d think you  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 are basically lazy.        not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would feel you were forced into doing  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 something you did not want to do.   not likely  very likely 
 
c) You would think: “I should be more   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 concerned about people who are less       not likely                      very likely 
 fortunate.” 
   
 d) You would feel great that you had helped others. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
         not likely                      very likely 
 
 e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - -5 
         not likely                      very likely 
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15.  You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog runs away. 
 
a) You would think, “I am irresponsible    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 and incompetent.”        not likely  very likely  
      
b) You would think your friend must not take  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 very good care of the dog or it wouldn’t   not likely  very likely 
 have run away. 
 
c) You would vow to be more careful next time.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
            not likely                      very likely 
  
 d) You would think your friend could just get  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  a new dog.      not likely                      very likely 
 
 
16.  You attend you’re a student’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new 
cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
 
a) You think the student should have    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 expected some accidents at such a   not likely  very likely  
 big party. 
 
      
b) You would stay late to help clean up the   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 stain after the party.     not likely  very likely 
  
c) You would wish you were anywhere   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 but at the party.         not likely                      very likely 
    
 d) You would wonder why the student   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  chose to serve red wine with the new   not likely                      very likely 
  light carpet. 
 
  
  
33
Interpretation 
The TOSCA-3 is composed of 11 negative and 5 positive scenarios yielding indices of Shame-Proneness, 
Guilt-Proneness, Externalization, Detachment/Unconcern. Alpha Pride, and Beta Pride. The scale scores 
are the sum of responses to relevant items (e.g., the score for the Shame scale equals the respondent’s 
answer to 1a, plus the answer to 2b, etc.). The scoring for the TOSCA-3 is as follows: 
1.  (Negative Scenario) 
   a) Shame 
   b) Detached 
   c) Guilt 
    d) Externalization 
9.  (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Externalization 
 b) Shame 
 c) Detached 
 d) Guilt 
2.  (Negative Scenario) 
   a) Guilt 
   b) Shame 
  c) Externalization 
 d) Detached 
10. (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Detached 
 b) Externalization 
 c) Guilt 
 d) Shame 
3. (Positive Scenario) 
 a) Guilt 
 b) Alpha Pride 
 c) Beta Pride 
 d) Externalization 
 e) Shame 
11. (Positive Scenario) 
 a) Externalization 
 b) Shame 
 c) Beta Pride 
 d) Alpha Pride 
 e) Guilt 
4. (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Shame 
 b) Externalization 
 c) Guilt 
 d) Detached 
12. (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Detached 
 b) Shame 
 c) Externalization 
 d) Guilt 
5.  (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Externalization 
     b) Detached 
  c) Shame 
   d) Guilt 
13. (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Externalization 
 b) Shame 
 c) Guilt 
 d) Detached 
6.  (Positive Scenario) 
 a) Alpha Pride 
 b) Guilt 
 c) Shame 
 d) Beta Pride 
 e) Externalization 
14. (Positive Scenario) 
 a) Shame 
 b) Externalization 
 c) Guilt 
 d) Beta Pride 
 e) Alpha Pride 
7.  (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Shame 
 b) Externalization 
 c) Detached 
 d) Guilt 
15. (Negative Scenario)  
 a) Shame 
 b) Externalization  
 c) Guilt 
 d) Detached  
8.  (Positive Scenario) 
 a) Shame 
 b) Externalization 
 c) Guilt 
 d) Alpha Pride 
 e) Beta Pride 
16. (Negative Scenario) 
 a) Detached 
 b) Guilt  
 c) Shame 
 d) Externalization 
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A.4 Supplementary figures
Figure A3: Elicitation of player B’s choice in both experiments
Suppose that player A believes that ...
0 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
1 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
2 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
3 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
4 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
5 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
6 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
7 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
8 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
9 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
10 out of 10 B-players choose Left. What do you choose? Left ©© Right.
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A.5 Supplementary tables
Table A1: Rank correlations between economic guilt sensitivity and TOSCA-3 emotional disposi-
tions in Dictator game
Low Stakes Mid Stakes High Stakes
Guilt proneness -0.148 (p = .081) -0.213 (p = .011) -0.219 (p = .009)
Shame proneness -0.022 (p = .796) -0.055 (p = .519) -0.080 (p = .345)
Detachment 0.013 (p = .880) 0.071 (p = .398) 0.065 (p = .448)
Externalization 0.061 (p = .476) 0.069 (p = .420) -0.045 (p = .598)
Pride (a) 0.124 (p = .146) 0.040 (p = .643) 0.046 (p = .592)
Pride (b) 0.129 (p = .128) 0.101 (p = .235) 0.070 (p = .411)
Notes: The table reports Spearman rank correlations (and p-values) between switch points and the six emotional
dispositions elicited in the TOSCA-3 questionnaire for each of the stake levels in the Dictator game. Low stakes
correspond to a distribution of (48, 50) under Left and a distribution of (22, 54) under Right. Mid and High stakes
correspond to the double and quadruple of these stakes, respectively.
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Table A2: Full set of best-fitting TOSCA-3 guilt scenarios and model selection criteria
# Scenarios k TOSCA-3 scenarios and corresponding guilt items
1 11e
2 11e 9d
3 11e 9d 5d
4 11e 9d 13c 5d
5 11e 9d 13c 16b 5d
6 11e 9d 13c 16b 12d 5d
7 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 5d 6b
8 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 5d 6b 10c
9 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 5d 6b 10c 4c
10 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c
11 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d
12 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d 14c
13 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d 14c 3a
14 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d 14c 3a 8c
15 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d 14c 3a 8c 15c
16 11e 9d 13c 16b 2a 12d 5d 6b 10c 4c 7d 14c 3a 8c 15c 1c
# Scenarios k R2 AIC AICC BIC
1 0.0462704 869.244 869.4835 878.6865
2 0.0761112 864.7556 865.117 877.3456
3 0.0853834 863.9938 864.5029 879.7313
4 0.0900175 864.0871 864.77 882.972
5 0.0940376 864.2862 865.1697 886.3187
6 0.0946392 865.1264 866.2375 890.3064
7 0.0962636 865.7655 867.132 894.093
8 0.0951526 866.9184 868.5684 898.3933
9 0.0941883 868.0366 869.9988 902.659
10 0.0927618 869.2356 871.5394 907.0055
11 0.0906431 870.5584 873.2336 911.4758
12 0.0879513 871.9816 875.0585 916.0465
13 0.0840024 873.6326 877.1423 920.8451
14 0.0781703 875.6252 879.5993 925.9852
15 0.0722545 877.6194 882.09 931.1268
16 0.0662402 879.6176 884.6176 936.2725
Notes: The upper part reports subsets of TOSCA-3 scenarios (numbered) and corresponding items capturing emo-
tions of guilt (lettered) derived using the leaps and bounds algorithm. The bottom part presents for each subset
the corresponding adjusted R2, the Akaike information criterion AIC, the corrected Akaike Information Criterion
AICC, and the Bayesian Information Criterion BIC.
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